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PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND THE AUDITOR 
Accountants are associated with financial information in ways that increasingly 
diverge from traditional historical financial statements. The involvement of an 
accountant in preparing and reviewing prospective financial information is a prime 
example of this phenomenon. Since the 1970's, investors, lenders, and financial analysts 
have steadily increased their demand for future-oriented business and financial 
information . This information helps users of financial information make rational and 
more accurate lending and investment decisions. However, the accounting profession is 
seriously concerned with the level of responsibility and legal liability that it may face in 
becoming involved with forecasted information (Koga and Robertson 1989, p. 43). This 
emphasis on the importance of prospecti ve information and the need for it to be credible 
creates the need for the accounting profession to develop standards for the involvement 
with prospective financial information. 
According to the American Accounting Association's A Statement of Basic 
Auditing Concepts (1972; Cockburn and Gordon, 1988), auditing can be defined as "a 
systematic process of objecti vely obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding assertions 
about economic actions and events to ascertain the degree of correspondence between 
those assertions and established criteria and communicating the results to interested 
users." The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not permit any company 
to list its organization on any exchanges without having its financial information audited 
by an independent accountant at least annually. However, an organization in its infant 
stages of development does not have the historical information to serve as a foundation. 
In order to attract investors and creditors, the organization must provide future-oriented 
information that is sound and attainable and provides assurance to its stakeholders. 
Allowing an independent accountant compile and/or examine the prospective financial 
information provides better assurance that the assumptions and prospecti ve financial 
statements are consistent and "reasonably objective." 
Past Auditing Research 
Instances where prospective financial information is demanded are lending 
situations. Loan officers, in evaluating loan proposals, need to judge the prospecti ve 
client's ability to pay the obligation as stated in the loan agreement. To insure the 
accuracy of the data in financial statements, the loan officer generally requires that an 
independent accountant perform an audit on the statements. In this case, the auditor's 
formal means of communicating any uncertainties within the loan proposal is through the 
audit opinion . 
To illustrate the significance of accountants' involvement in looking at future-
oriented information, Libby (1979) conducted an empirical study that examined the 
effects of the loan decision behavior of the accountant disclosing an uncertainty in 
footnotes of the financial statements, and of adding the auditor's "subject to" uncertainty 
qualification in the footnote disclosures. The results of his experiment showed that the 
disclosure of uncertainty had a major effect on the loan officers' (subjects) risk 
assessments; however, the addition of the auditor's qualification had no effect on this 
information. Although an explanation for this could be the redundancy of information , it 
does raise questions as to the strength of an auditor's opinion in the context of a loan 
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proposal. The focus on the communication process between the auditor and the banker, 
according to Libby, is on the reporting deficiencies, which result in departures from the 
auditor's standard report (36). By requiring an audit, the loan officer is demonstrating 
that there is reliance on the auditor's judgment (opinion) as a degree of credibility and 
value for the financial information (35-36). 
Likewise, Strawser (1994) conducted a study to examine the effects of the 
accountant's involvement with forecasts on the decisions and perceptions of commercial 
lenders. Also using a sample of commercial lenders and a hypothetical loan candidate's 
forecasted financial statements in his study, the results indicated a higher probability of 
the loan candidate receiving a more favorable loan decision when an independent 
accountant examined the forecasted financial information. Moreover, the probability of 
the loan being granted increased when the same accountant performed an audit 
examination, indicating that the knowledge obtained by the accountant supports the 
assurances provided by examination procedures. Thus, as Strawser demonstrated, an 
audit lends credibility to accounting information generated by an organization and, 
enhances its value. 
A/CPA Pronouncements 
In October 1985, the Auditing Standards Board, under rule 201 of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of Professional Ethics, issued a 
Statement on Standards for Accountants' Services on Prospecti ve Financial Information, 
entitled, Financial Forecasts and Projections (FFP), establishing professional 
requirements and guidelines for reviewing prospective financial information. The 
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statement defines prospective financial statements as either "financial forecasts or 
financial projections including the summaries of significant assumptions and accounting 
policies" (FFP 1985, par. 6, p. 135; Guide, 1986,200.03, p. 11). Under this definition, 
pro forma financial statements and partial presentations are not considered prospective 
financial statements. In addition, the statement sets standards and provides guidance to 
accountants regarding the performance and reporting for engagements to compile, 
examine, or apply agreed-upon procedures to prospective financial statements (FFP 1985, 
par. 1, p. 134). The statement is codified with statements on auditing standards; however, 
it was not issued as a Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) because SASs establish 
standards related only to audits of historical financial statements. As a result, the AICPA 
believed that these standards would be beneficial to accountants, clients, and users of 
prospective financial statements by establishing consistency in accountants' services and 
. reports on them (Pallais and Guy, 1986, p. 90). 
To accompany the FFP, the AICPA issued an implementation guide, Guide/or 
Prospective Financial Statements (Guide) in 1986. These two publications provide 
general guidelines for auditors' responsibilities in the context of prospective financial 
information; they do not present details about applying the specific procedures in 
conducting accountants' services, nor do they address any di fficulties that may arise 
(Koga and Robertson, 1989, p. 42). The Guide establishes presentation guidelines for 
prospective financial statements (i.e., analogous to generally accepted accounting 
principles) and provides explanatory and illustrative material on the accountants' services 
described in the FFP and suggestions about methods of preparing prospective financial 
statements and about services not covered. 
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However, while the accountant may the party (i.e., 
management) in identifying assumptions, gathering information, or assembling the 
prospective financial the AICPA prohibits accountants from providing 
services on prospecti ve information for third-party use if the statements do not disclose 
the underlying assumptions or if statements appropriate only limited use are to be 
distributed to users that are not negotiating directly with the issuer. Uses prospective 
financial statements are distinguished between "general" and "limited" uses. General use 
IS use prospective financial statements by individuals with whom the responsible 
party is not negotiating directly. In this case, only the development of a financial forecast 
is appropriate. On the other hand, limited use is use prospective financial 
statements by the responsible (management) party alone or by the responsible party and 
third with whom the responsible party is negotiating directly. An would 
be if the responsible party was negotiating for a bank loan. The limited use of 
prospective financial statements allows for either a financial forecast or a financial 
projection with hypothetical assumptions. 
"Reasonably Objective Basis" 
Since the issuance of the two publications, practitioners have requested additional 
guidance and literature on some common areas of practice where existing literature 
not provide explicit directions. In response to the demand for more clarification on 
prospective financial the AICP A established the and Projections 
Force in 1987 to identify problems in implementing two pronouncements to 
determine whether additional guidance was needed (Carmichael, Blanco, and Dirkes, 
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1988). Since then, numerous Statements of Position (SOP) have been issued as 
amendments to the Guide to help clarify the roles and responsibilities of accountants in 
dealing with prospective financial statements. In particular, SOP 92-2, "Questions and 
Answers on the Tenn Reasonably Objective Basis and Other Issues Affecting Prospective 
Financial Statements" provides clarification on the evaluation of the forecasted data. 
Applying only to financial forecasts, the SOP also provides guidance for evaluating 
whether the length of forecast periods is appropriate and guidance for disclosures that 
may be necessary for periods beyond the forecasted periods. In addition, it discusses the 
accountant's responsibilities for evaluating 1) whether the responsible party has a 
"reasonably objective basis" to present a financial forecast and 2) the responsible party's 
disclosure of long-tenn results (Dirkes, 1992). 
When evaluating whether a reasonably objective basis exists, there is no substitute 
for the responsible party's knowledge of the organization's business and industry. This 
applies to third-party involvement such as an independent accountant because a financial 
forecast is a "quantification of the responsible party's plan and on the responsible party 
has the authority to carry out those plans" (Dirkes, 1992). According to the AICPA, an 
accountant should not examine a future-oriented presentation that omits all disclosures of 
assumptions (FFP 1985, par. 40, p. 140). Because users expect financial forecasts to 
present the responsible party's best estimate, the tenn "reasonably objective basis" was 
included in the Guide to communicate to the responsible party an expected level of 
quality of infonnation necessary to present a forecast. The responsible party should be 
able to demonstrate that such a basis exists; otherwise, a financial forecast should not be 
presented (Dirkes, 1992). 
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To establish a "reasonably objective basis" to present a financial forecast, the 
responsible party must be able to point to data and other references in support of the 
significant assumptions . Factors that the responsible party should consider when 
evaluating whether assumptions underlying a financial forecast are appropriate include 
the following (SOP 1992, par. 8, p. 5): 
• there appears to be a rational relationship between the assumptions and the 
underlying facts and circumstances; 
• assumptions are complete; 
• assumptions are developed without undue optimism or pessimism; 
• assumptions are consistent with the entity's plan and expectations; 
• assumptions are consistent with each other; and 
• assumptions make sense in the context of the forecast taken as a whole . 
It is important that the responsible party is not overly biased in selecting the assumptions; 
undue optimism may cause backlash to the preparer and the independent accountants 
when a financial forecast is challenged by those with the benefit of hindsight (Dirkes, 
1992). 
Auditor Responsibility and Examination 
Regardless of the extent of the accountant's participation, the assumptions remain 
the responsibility of the responsible party. The responsible party must evaluate the 
assumptions, make key decisions, and adopt and present the assumptions as its own 
(Guide, 1986,220.03, p. 17). When the responsible party is making assumptions when 
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fonning prospective financial statements, occasionally, assumptions are 
predicted to relate directly to a 
careful to obtain support for 
prospective action. accountant will need to be 
that are dependent on the action of users. 
In the 
should 
examining if the assumptions are "reasonably objective," the accountant 
in mind the following whether (FFP, Appendix C, para. I I, 147): 
• sufficient pertinent (external and internal) sources of information about the 
assumptions have considered; 
• assumptions are consistent with the sources from which they are derived; 
• assumptions are consistent with each other; and 
• logical assumptions or theory, considered with 
assumptions, are reasonable. 
data supporting the 
A way to safeguard the accountant's potential liability is to obtain 
representation in which the party indicates its responsibility to the 
assumptions and presentation. Besides being required by AICPA forecasts and 
projections standards, courts view them as evidence of responsibility for financial 
statements. 
The objective of the accountant an 
statements and significant assumptions is to accumulate sufficient evidence to limit 
attestation risk to a level that is appropriate for the level of assurance. The accountant 
to establish with the client a understanding about the nature of the 
The AICPA recommenas using an 19agernellt letter to document that 
understanding-the more accountant's ""',,""Hr'''' the more important it is to 
have an that exact nature the (Pallais, 
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1994). In addition, the extent to how detailed an accountant performs the examination 
procedures should be based on the accountant's consideration of (FFP, Appendix C, para. 
8, p. 135): 
• the nature and materiality of the information to the prospective financial 
statements taken as a whole; 
• the likelihood of misstatements; 
• knowledge obtained during current and previous engagements; 
• the responsible party's competence with respect to prospective financial 
statements; 
• extent to which the prospective financial statements are affected by the 
responsible party's judgment; and 
• the adequacy of the responsible party's underlying data. 
To understand the nature of the company, the accountant needs sufficient knowledge of 
the client's industry in order to identify any material misstatements in the prospective 
financial statements. This, however, is not knowledge that accountant is required to have 
before accepting the engagement; this type of knowledge can be acquired during the 
process of the engagement. Moreover, the accountant may use specialists in order to 
confirm and support management's assumptions; the accountant, in this case, does not 
have to reanalyze the specialist's conclusions, but needs to consider whether they appear 
reasonable (Pallais, 1994). 
The accountant's main responsibility is for the report and the work that underlies 
it. In the report, the accountant provides assurance only about whether the prospective 
financial statements are presented in conformity with ACIPA presentation guidelines and 
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whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's predictions. The 
accountant does not provide assurance about the achievability of the prospective results 
issuing a statement declaring that the accountant has no responsibility to update the report 
for events and circumstances occurring after the date of the report. In addition, the 
accountant does not have the obligation to notify management and the users if he/she 
happens to find out results diverged from the forecast (FFP, Appendix C, par. 7, p.135). 
Auditor Risk 
However, even wi th AICP A standards and regulations developed for accountants 
engaged with prospective information, there are other limitations that the profession must 
face. First, since most future-oriented information is used to make investment decisions, 
opinions on prospective financial information are more subjective than opinions on 
historical financial information due to the degree of high uncertainty (Cockburn and 
Gordon 1988, p. 57). In this case, the auditor may face the risk that users of the 
prospective financial information will depend on the opinion as a guarantee of future 
results. This creates a potential legal liability for the accounting profession. Second, the 
accountant's evaluation of management's assumptions that underlie the forecast may be 
limited by the level of expertise the accountant has. The potential implications for these 
issues will be further discussed in the next two chapters. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter discusses 
the phenomenon of hindsight bias and the research conducted to analyze and examine its 
existence as well as ways of mitigating it. Chapter three reviews the literature and 
develops hypotheses relating to hindsight bias and its effect on prospective information. 
Chapters four and five focus on the experimental design and methodology, and provide 
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an analysis of the results, respectively. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the results 




Research in both psychology and accounting has documented a phenomenon 
known as the hindsight effect, where people tend judge a possible outcome as ex ante 
more likely when they know that the outcome has already occurred. They believe that 
they "knew it all along." Also known as hindsight bias, this mentality results in 
situations where people believe that others should have been able to foresee events much 
better than was actually the case. Individuals even distort their own predictions so as to 
exaggerate in hindsight what they knew in foresight (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 
1982, p. 428) . Thus, hindsight bias refers to the tendency for people to: 1) believe that an 
outcome was relatively inevitable, and 2) overestimate how foreseeable the outcome was 
in foresight (Jennings, Lowe, and Reckers 1998, p. 144). 
The existence of hindsight bias is based upon the belief that if indi viduals look, 
they will be able to discern some interpretable patterns. Individuals act as if they are 
unable to separate outcome knowledge from pre-outcome knowledge (knowledge that 
existed prior to the outcome) (Buchman, 1985). There are situations that, due to the 
limitation and uncertainty of the information, occasional surprises and failures are 
ihevitable. However, it is both unfair and self-defeating to blame the decision maker who 
has erred in an imperfect system without the acknowledgment that the system is fallible 
and doing something to improve the system. According to Kahneman et. al. (1982), 
hindsight bias seems to be, "quite robust and widespread. Reducing it requires some 
understanding of and hypotheses about people's cogniti ve processes" (431). Fischhoff 
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(1975) suggested that in hindsight, decision makers integrate outcome knowledge with 
pre-outcome knowledge in trying to form a coherent and complete explanation. 
According to his research, people who receive outcome knowledge are, "unaware of its 
having changed their perceptions in the manner where an outcome's occurrence increases 
its perceived probability of occurrence" (288). Studied extensively in the psychological 
and accounting fields, many researchers have documented the existence of hindsight bias; 
yet, few attempts have been made to explain the reason for its existence. 
According to Hawkins and Hastie (1990), the hindsight effect is a "projection of 
new knowledge into the past accompanied by a denial that the outcome information has 
influenced judgment" (311). Reflected in past research, where subjects assigned 
probabilities to future probable outcomes of a given scenario, hindsight bias has been 
defined as a significantly higher conditional probability assigned (by subjects) to an 
outcome in the hindsight condition (having knowledge of the outcome) than in the 
foresight condition (having no outcome knowledge). In their study, Reimers and Butler 
(1992) noted that, although most experiments have been posed as tests of subjects' ability 
to reconstruct a foresightful state of knowledge, rather than as tests of how extensive that 
knowledge was, the temptations to exaggerate might still remain. 
Likewise, Brown and Solomon (1987) demonstrated that in the managerial 
context, hindsight bias exists when performance evaluations are conducted. Managers 
must often rely on internal accounting and managerial information systems when 
evaluating other managers' and subordinates' decisions and their evaluations on 
accounting data. As a result, their decisions may be subject to the hindsight effect (187). 
Using the scenario of a capital budgeting committee approving a video movie rental 
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project, subjects were asked to indicate how strongly they believed that the committee's 
approval of the video movie rental project was a significant judgment error. The primary 
results from the experiment were that subjects with the benefit of outcome knowledge 
(hindsight) knowledge affected the evaluations of the committee's decision (565). Thus, 
Brown and Solomon demonstrated that when [managerial] decisions are evaluated after 
the evaluator knows the results of those decisions, the knowledge of the outcome might 
influence in how the evaluator perceives the manager. 
Strength of Hindsight Bias 
The strength of hindsight bias becomes a function of how improbable or how 
surprising the outcome. Buchman (1985) attempted to demonstrate this by trying to 
examine whether the hindsight effect existed in the public reporting environment. 
Subjects (graduate students in their last semester of their masters studies) were asked to 
predict the probability of a company declaring bankruptcy within the subsequent fiscal 
year. Subjects were divided into two groups: a foresight group (pre-outcome knowledge 
only) and a hindsight group (pre-outcome knowledge and outcome knowledge). The 
subjects in the hindsight group were told that the company went bankrupt in the 
subsequent year, but were asked to ignore this information when assigning the 
probabilities, whereas the foresight group had no knowledge of the bankruptcy outcome. 
Buchman also examined the effects of the auditors' opinion by giving one group each in 
the foresight and hindsight groups a qualified opinion to see if there was any "surprise" 
effect as a result of the opinion. The other two groups received a standard unqualified 
opinion. Since past research has indicated that hindsight bias has been found to be the 
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greatest when a less likely event occurs, then it would be expected that subjects who were 
told that a firm receiving an unqualified opinion went bankrupt would exhibit more 
hindsight bias than subjects who were told that a firm receiving a going concern opinion 
went bankrupt (269). 
The results of Buchman's experiment show that although subjects in the hindsight 
group were asked to ignore their knowledge of the bankruptcy, they were unable to do so; 
however, greater hindsight bias was also exhibited where there should have been less 
surprise (274). In addition, both the hindsight and foresight groups showed a significant 
hindsight bias of similar magnitude (Reimers and Butler, 1992, p. 187). Applying this in 
the context of the accounting profession, if the subjects were actual judges or jurors in a 
litigation case, when contemplating charges against an auditor, the auditor could face 
senous repercussIOns. 
Auditing Environment 
As evident in Buchman's experiment, the audit setting is conducive to the causal 
reconstruction given the fact that the accountant has detailed documentation of the audit 
through the workpapers. These workpapers can serve as incriminating evidence against 
the accountant in the event that the accountant faces litigation from the client or other 
stakeholders (Jennings, Lowe, and Reckers, 1998, p. 145). Because of this potential 
consequence, auditors, knowing that their judgments are evaluated in hindsight, want to 
demonstrate due professional care. In the likely case where the auditor faces litigation, 
hindsight bias could influence a judge or juror since they have the set of facts that were 
available to the auditor prior to outcome. Either the judge or the jurors will need to 
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decide if the auditor: 1) gathered sufficient and competent evidence upon which to fonn 
an opinion, and 2) if enough evidence was gathered, whether the auditor reached a sound 
judgment about the financial statements and issued the appropriate opinion (Buchman 
1985, p. 267). However, research studies show that judges may be unable to disregard 
outcome infonnation in their legal judgments, thus exhibiting hindsight bias. 
To address the issue the question of potential audit litigation, Jennings, Lowe, and 
Reckers (1998) conducted research on causality as an influence on hindsight bias and 
examined judges' evaluation of professional audit judgment. In the context of an external 
audit legal liability scenario, judges are typically presented with a negative outcome in 
which case, they are asked to ignore and base their review and evaluation of their 
judgments on the [defendant] auditor's perfonnance prior to the occurrence of the 
negative outcome (150). The s'ubjects (general jurisdiction judges) were given a case to 
review and make selected decisions related to the auditor's perfonnance. Subjects were 
asked to provide evaluation judgments based upon the auditor's behavior prior to the 
occurrence of the negati ve outcome. 
Results of the study confinned that the subjects' assessment of the auditor's 
responsibility to foresee the outcome was positively correlated with the degree of 
foreseeability. The judges gave the auditor lower evaluations when there was a causal 
relationship between the outcome and the events prior to the outcome, demonstrating the 
existence of hindsight bias. Likewise, when the judges were provided with an 
unforeseeable outcome, hindsight bias was not observed. Thus, even in situations where 
objectivity is crucial (i.e., legal settings), research suggests that evaluators (e.g., judges) 
tend to link responsibility to the decision maker for negati ve outcomes in relation to the 
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perception that the decision maker should have foreseen the outcome (Jennings et. a!., 
1998, p. 149; cited from Brown et. a!., 1994; Chaiken and Darley, 1973; Mitchell and 
Kalb,1981). 
Besides trying to examine the existence and effects of hindsight bias, there have 
been attempts in past research to focus on "debiasing" strategies to reduce the amount of 
hindsight effect exhibited by evaluators. Although these attempts to mitigate hindsight 
bias have not been successful, the procedures to reduce it may cause more trouble if it 
increases people's faith in their judgmental abilities more than it improves their abilities 
(Kahneman et a!., 1982; p 575). Reimers and Butler (1992) suggest that rather than alter 
the hindsight judgment as prior researchers have done, it may be useful to make the 
foresight judgment more like the hindsight judgment (188). Attempts to reduce the 
hindsight effects will be beneficial to the auditing profession and others who are placed in 
the situation of having to examine and provide some type of review and/or evaluation for 
third parties. Further research should focus on the explanation and reasons for existence 
of the hindsight bias phenomenon. 
One possible attraction of hindsight bias is that it may be flattering for individuals 
to represent themselves as having known all along what was going to happen. On the 
other hand, if, in retrospect, the outcome appears to have seemed relatively likely, 
decision makers can do little more than berate themselves for not taking the appropriate 
steps that their knowledge seems to have dictated (Kahneman et aI., 1982; p 342; 429). 
Hindsight bias is highly visible in many instances where business decision are made; as 
more researchers study this phenomenon, a greater understanding of the cognitive 
processes involved will be achieved. Chapter three will take this subject of hindsight bias 
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and place it in the context of prospective financial information and study the impact it 
may have on auditors who review these types of information. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
The occurrence of the hindsight effect in both courtrooms and financial markets 
may cause serious repercussions for the accountant and the reputation of the accounting 
firm. Prior research in both the auditing and psychology fields, as discussed in Chapters 
one and two, demonstrates that hindsight bias is prevalent and may produce negative 
effects for the accountant profession. This chapter characterizes the research problem 
and formulates several hypotheses concerning the existence of hindsight bias and when 
accountants examine prospective financial information. 
When the AICPA published both the FFP and the Guide in 1985 and 1986, 
respecti vely, the objecti ve was to establish guidelines for the preparation and presentation 
of prospective financial statements and also to inform and assist accountants in 
performing professional services. These pronouncements also provide guidance to the 
responsible parties for preparing prospective financial information, insuring that any 
assumptions developed do provide a "reasonably objective basis." However, in assisting 
the responsible party with the development and/or preparation of the prospective 
financial statements, the assumptions and predictions remain the responsibility of the 
responsible party. In section 220.01 of the Guide (1986, p. 17), it states: 
The responsible party cannot guarantee the achievement of the 
financial results set forth in the prospective financial statements because 
achievability depends on many factors that are outside of its control. 
However, the responsible party may influence the operations of an entity 
through planning, organizing, controlling, and directing its activities and, 
therefore, is in a position to develop reasonable or appropriate 
assumptions in respect to key factors. 
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Although the auditor's report explicitly states this and warns users that the actual results 
will probably differ from the prospective results, this warning is probably not enough to 
prevent aggrieved parties from holding auditors directly responsible for deviations from 
expectations. When a lawsuit is brought against the responsible party and the 
independent accountant, the courts try to determine whether the assumptions that fail to 
come true were appropriate at the time they were made. This, in tum, may cause the 
existence of hindsight bias when judges or jurors may rule in favor of the plaintiff and 
find the accountant (defendant) negligent. 
The Legal Environment 
Courts usually recognize that prospective financial information and assumptions 
are less stable, and therefore less reliable than historical information. Yet, at the same 
time, judges acknowledge the fact that users rely on prospective information to make 
financial decisions. Thus, the court opinions usually indicate where judges believe that 
the middle ground lies-sometimes in favor of the accountant, and other times allowing a 
jury to decide the outcome even when an accountant did not expect third-party reliance 
on the report (Pallais, 1994). 
In Eisenberg v. Gagnon (1990), the plaintiffs argued that the defendant 
accounting firm allowed fraudulent financial projections and assumptions to be included 
in the offering memoranda for the sale of securities. The trial judge found in favor of the 
accountant, however, in the appellate court, the judge stated that the district court failed 
to instruct the jurors that projections and opinions that fall within the domain of 
"actionable misrepresentation" may have affected the jurors' verdicts; therefore, the 
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stated that appellate court must overturn the trial court's verdict in favor of the 
accountant (defendant). The assumption in question was a coal reserve report where the 
appeals court believed there were sufficient problems for accountant to been 
skeptical of it. According to instructions of court, the of fraudulent 
misrepresentation means a representation that, "an existing fact is true, it being known to 
the person making said representation that the facts represented to exist do not in 
exist and that said representation is false." In this case, the judge allowed the case to 
to a trial with ajury to decide the issue. Likewise, in Longden v. Sunderman, as 
Pallais (1994) reports, the plaintiffs alleged that the prospective financial statements were 
unrealistic and that the accountant should have known this because the client's projects 
were failing. Although the accountant's opinion warned that the actual results would 
probably differ from the prospective results, the judge felt that this caveat was 
and was not a reason to the accountants 
In the two previous cases discussed above, the judge allowed the cases to proceed 
where the accountant might potential and legal liability. In other cases, in 
contrast, the has acknowledged the caveats in the accountants' 
favor of them. Although present study not address the courtroom 
environment, it does examine how third-party examiners assess the accountant's 
involvement in preparation, presentation, and disclosure of prospective financial 
information and assumptions. 
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Hypotheses 
Although prior research has not focused on the existence of hindsight bias in the 
context of prospective financial infonnation, studies by Buchman (1985) and Strawser 
(1994) suggest that users and decision makers of financial infonnation, both historical 
and prospective, depend on the independent accountant as providing a source of reliance 
and assurance to the statements. By taking components and views from each study, three 
hypotheses were developed and tested experimentally through the use of a questionnaire 
where participants to assume the role of a Joan examiner in analyzing past loan decisions. 
The first hypothesis addressed in the study examines the existence of whether 
hindsight bias exists in the examination of a company's prospective financial and 
operations infonnation by giving an extreme outcome: a company filing for bankruptcy 
after two years of operations. Assuming the role as a loan examiner, the participants 
were divided into a foresight (only pre-outcome knowledge) and a hindsight (pre-
outcome and outcome knowledge) and were asked whether or not they felt that the right 
decision was made, on the part of the bank, to grant the hypothetical start-up company 
the loan. This hypothesis serves to compare the differences in responses between 
participants in the foresight group versus those who are in the hindsight group. Based on 
prior studies, participants who do receive the outcome knowledge about the bankruptcy 
should rate the loan officer's decision lower than those who have only the foresight 
knowledge. 
HI: Evaluations of whether or not the loan officer made the right 
decision made with the benefit of outcome knowledge (hindsight) 
will be lower than those made only with pre-outcome knowledge 
(foresight). 
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The second hypothesis examines the effect the audit opinion on the participants 
and how it relates to the loan granted by the loan officer. Similar to the second 
hypothesis tested by Buchman (1985), the researcher uses two different audit opinions to 
test for the effect of the hindsight effect: 1) an unqualified opinion in the context of 
prospective financial information stating that the company's forecast is in conformity 
with guidelines for the presentation of a forecast established by the AICPA, and that the 
underlying assumptions provide a "reasonably objective basis," and 2) an unqualified 
opinion with some discussion or comments by the accountant about certain items 
disclosed in the prospective financial information and assumptions for which the reader 
may need to take note . Similar to the assumptions that Buchman developed, in this 
experiment, hindsight participants who do receive the audit opinion with additional 
comments should be less "surprised" (thus, exhibiting less hindsight bias) when they are 
told that the bankruptcy outcome than the participants who receive the standard 
unqualified opinion. As a result, hindsight participants who receive the clean audit 
opinion will rate the loan officer's decision lower (loan officer did not make the right 
decision) than the hindsight participants who receive the audit opinion with the comments 
about the assumptions included. This hypothesis will test the participants' reactions to 
these two types of unqualified opinions issued by the accountant. 
H2: The evaluation of the loan officer's decision will be lower for 
participants with outcome knowledge accompanied with the 
auditor's discussion of management's assumptions than 
participants with outcome knowledge accompanied with a standard 
unqualified opinion. 
The third hypothesis will examine the level of responsibility the accountant 
should exhibit based upon the participants' expectations from the information provided to 
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them in the experiment instrument. The evaluation of the auditor by third parties often 
depends upon how much importance they place on the accountant's involvement. In 
cases where the client faces negative results, even though the accountant produces an 
unqualified opinion, the possibility that some of the blame is placed on the accountant for 
not raising questions or exercising due professional care is higher than in situations where 
the accountant disclosed concerns and comments about the client's ability to perform. 
Therefore, the third hypothesis will try to show whether or not participants in the study 
with both the benefit of hindsight and the auditor's opinion with additional comments 
stress a higher rating ("Greater Responsibility") than participants without the benefit of 
hindsight. 
H3: The expectations of the accountant in evaluating management's 
assumptions and the prospecti ve financial statements will be higher 
in the hindsight groups than in foresight groups. 
In summary, hindsight bias can exist in the context of prospective as well as 
historical financial information. Its presence in the context of prospective financial 
information, especially when third parties rely on it, may not protect the accountant from 
serious litigation conditions or reputation risk. The next chapter will describe the details 
of the experiment and research instrument used in testing for the presence of hindsight 
bias in the context of prospective financial reporting. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
To test the existence of hindsight bias in the context of prospecti ve financial 
statements and the potential if any, for auditor, the 
developed a hypothetical loan proposal of a company that included an industry 
overview, assumptions, and financial statements. Following a 
similar used Buchman (1985), study used a two-by-two between subjects 
research design to test the three hypotheses (Figure 4.1). Four different variations of 
questionnaire were given to the participants. Participants were divided into a foresight 
(pre-outcome knowledge only) and a hindsight and outcome 
knowledge). Participants in A and B were foresight group; participants in cells C 
and D were hindsight group. participants were also divided so that cells A and C 
received a standard unqualified opinion while cells Band D received an unqualified audit 















Figure 4.1. Research Design 
25 
I 
Research Instrument & Task 
According to the hypothetical scenario, MER, Inc., a medical billing and 
reimbursement company, was seeking to secure a $90,000 loan from a bank. The 
hypothetical loan officer granted the company this loan back in 1998, basing the decision 
on the prospecti ve financial statements projected for the years 2000 and 2001 and on the 
assumptions developed by management. The reason for using this type of company was 
because it was introducing new technology that would affect and revolutionize the 
current practices of seeking insurance claims in the medical field. However, with the 
introduction of new technology would bring about uncertainty issues such as 
compatibility of equipment and software and the ability to offset high set-up costs with 
revenues. Therefore, the assumptions in the questionnaire pointed out this possible 
uncertainty and also the changes that may affect the medical practice. 
Each participant randomly received one of the four versions of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire also contained a cover page that asked for participant information such 
as their rank, majors, and level of accounting and finance coursework. The researcher 
read and explained the "Introduction" and "Your role" sections of the questionnaire to the 
participants before asking them to read and answer the rest of the instrument. Figure 4.2 
shows the timeline of events given to the subjects in the research instrument. The 
participants were asked to assume the role of a loan examiner and were told that they 
were at the end of 2001 and were asked to evaluate the loan officer's decision. The 
following are the instructions provided for the participants to guide them through the 




You will assume the role of a financial process examiner. You have been 
asked to evaluate the loan decisions made by a loan officer. In 1999, the loan 
officer approved a loan proposal submitted by a start-up company based on a set 
of2-year prospective financial statements and assumptions made by the 
management of the company. It is now the end of 2001 and you will decide 
whether or not the loan officer made the right decision in evaluating this 
proposal. 
Participants 
You are Jt.ere 





Figure 4.2. Timeline given to participants in questionnaire 
The participants were 64 upper-level undergraduate and graduate students 
enrolled in high level accounting courses with the majority concentrating on either 
accounting or finance as their focus of study. All students had completed at least two 
accounting courses as required for prerequisites for the classes at which they were taken 
at the time of the experiment. The questionnaires were distributed during the end of class 
of the Summer 2001 quarter to three upper-level accounting courses that were required 
for either the accounting and/or finance major course requirements: Intermediate 
Financial Accounting II, Tax Accounting, and Advanced Accounting courses. The 
participants were randomly assigned to each cell in the experimental design. Choosing 
students as participants for this study was considered satisfactory because the level of 
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accounting background was sufficient with which to understand and analyze the 
information provided in the questionnaire. Appendix A contains the comprehensive list 
of the partici pants' demographics and responses to the questionnaire. 
Independent Variables 
Two between-subjects independent variables were manipulated in this study. The 
first independent variable was the reported outcome of the company in 2002 which took 
two levels: 1) a foresight condition and 2) a hindsight (bankruptcy) condition. In the 
foresight condition, participants were given a general case scenario, but were not given 
information about the subsequent events . Participants in the hindsight (bankruptcy) 
condition were given the general case scenario, but then were told that the company went 
bankrupt the subsequent year and asked to ignore this information when answering the 
questions. 
The second between-subjects independent variable was the accountant's audit 
opinion after reviewing management's assumptions and the prospective financial 
information which also took two levels: 1) a standard unqualified opinion and 2) an 
unqualified opinion with additional comments about management's assumptions. 
Dependent Variables 
After reviewing the case information, and outcome (to the appropriate subjects), 
the participants were asked to respond to three sets of questions . In the first question, all 
participants were asked to indicate how strongly they believed that the loan officer's 
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decision, at the time [he/she] made it, to grant the was the right decision by 
answering the following question: 
How strongly do you believe that the loan officer's 
=='-'-'-"=~ to grant the loan was the decision? 
The response was elicited on an iI-point scale that ranged from (Strongly believe that 
the loan officer did not make the right decision) to +5 (Strongly believe that the loan 
officer made the right decision). effect of outcome information is measured as the 
in the responses of the foresight and hindsight participants. 
question referred to the to the question by what factors 
in the case gi ven influenced them to provide the answer in the first question: 
What other factors in infonnation given influenced you in selecting the 
answer above? 
Answering this question, participants listed factors that they found to affect 
question. Appendix A contains a list of the comments made 
and their to the first third part of the 
questionnaire portion asked the participants to answer five questions. These questions 
the participants to evaluate the relationship and strength of the information 
provided in the case and the responsibility of the auditor: 
1. much responsibility is the CPA assuming for the accuracy of the 
forecasted financ ial statements? 
2. How confident are you that the forecasted financial statements 
reflect the probable future financial position, results of operations, and 
cash flows of MBR, Inc. 's services? 
3. How much assurance is the CPA with respect to achievability of 
forecasted 
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4. To what extent do you feel the CPA evaluated the assumptions made by 
the management of MBR, Inc. 's services to generate the projected 
financial statements? 
5. In making a loan decision, how much reliance would you place on the 
projected financial statements? 
Responses were elicited on a seven-point scale, one indicated that "Little Responsibility" 
and seven indicated "Great Responsibility." The responses to the third set of questions 
are also in Appendix A. 
Appendix B contains: 1) a copy of the questionnaire given to the participants in 
cell A, 2) the instructions given to subjects in cell C and D disclosing the bankruptcy of 
the company, and 3) the opinion with discussion about the future feasibility of 
management's assumptions in cells Band D. Chapter five will discuss the results of the 
experiment, accept or reject the hypotheses tested, and analyze the outcomes and their 
relationships to the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND ANAL YSIS 
The first three sections below present the test results for each of the hypotheses. A 
two-way analysis of variance (ANOY A) approach is used to test these hypotheses 
(Daniel and Terrell, 1992, p. 404-411). Figure 5.1 presents the mean probabilities and 
the number of participants in each cell assigned to the outcomes to questions in parts one 
and three given in the questionnaire. 
The first hypothesis tests whether the evaluations made with the benefit of 
hindsight (outcome knowledge) will be significantly lower than those made only with 
foresight (pre-outcome knowledge only) . From Figure 5.1 , the foresight group ().lRD(A+B) 
= +2.000) felt stronger about the decision made by the loan officer to grant the loan than 
the hindsight group in cells C and D ().lRD(C+D) = +1.758). Table 5.1 presents the results , 
indicating that although the rating was higher, the differences exhibited between the 
foresight and the hindsight was not significant enough to be statistically meaningful. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested in this study is not supported. There was one 
participant (#17) who did not respond to the first question, but did respond to the 
remaining questions in the instrument. From this non-response, the actual mean response 
from cell A is different ().lRD (A) = 2.313; S.D. = 0.793); however, even with this increase 





























































AR: Accountant's responsibility mean and (S .D.) for all five questions: Scale 1 to 7 
n: number of subjects in the cell. 
Figure 5.1. Mean and standard deviations by cell. 
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The second hypothesis tests whether the expectations of the accountant in 
evaluating management's assumptions and the prospective financial statements will be 
higher in the hindsight groups than in foresight groups. The researcher wanted to see if 
participants who had both the benefits of hindsight and also an unqualified opinion with 
comments on management's assumptions would give rate the loan officer's decision than 
participants who had the benefit of hindsight and the standard unqualified opinion. From 
Figure 5.1, hindsight participants who received the unqualified opinion with additional 
comments rated the loan officer's decision higher (J.lRD (0) = + 1.867) than the hindsight 
participants who received the standard unqualified opinion (J.lRD(C) = +1.667). Although, 
similar to the results for the first hypothesis, the results are not statistically meaningful, it 
does provide some speculation about the participants and the instrument used. Results of 
the ANOV A testing for the second hypothesis are in Table 5.1. In comparing overall 
total, participants who received the standard opinion did rate the loan officer's decision 
higher (J.lRD(A+C) = +1.914) than those who received the standard opinion with additional 
comments (J.lRD(B+D) = +1.828); again, these results are not statistically meaningful. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is not supported. 
Table 5.1 
ANOV A findings for foresight versus hindsight knowledge 
Sum of 
DF Sguares Mean Sguares F Value Pr (F) 
Knowledge 1 0.9394 0.939394 0.2651644 0.608486 
Opinion 1 0.1173 0.117251 0.0330965 0.8562552 
Knowledge: Opinion 1 1.3823 1.382291 0.3901818 0.5345721 
Error 60 212.5611 3.542684 
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Although the main focus of the experiment was on the first question in the 
research instrument, the researcher wanted to understand the expectations the accountant 
. faces as far as the level of responsibility expected. The third hypothesis tests whether the 
expectations of the accountant in evaluating the prospective financial statements and 
management's assumptions will be higher in the outcome knowledge groups than in 
foresight groups. According to Figure 5.1, the opposite of what was expected by the 
researcher occurred. Foresight participants (~RD (MB) = 4.516) attributed greater 
responsibili ty to the accountant than hindsight partici pants (~RD (C+D) = 3.994). Table 5.2 
presents the results. Thus, the third hypothesis is not supported. 
Table 5.2 






DF Squares Mean Squares 
108.966 108.9663 
8.594 8.594 
1 0.551 0.5511 









Overall, the results are not statistically meaningful to the hypotheses; therefore, 
all three hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Although the mean scores for hindsight 
participants were lower than foresight participants for the first hypothesis and also overall 
for the second hypothesis, the results were not significant enough to be statistically 
meaningful and effecti ve. Non-parametric procedures were also applied to the results; 
however since the experiment had a restricted data range (-5 to +5 and 1 to 7) for 
question one and three, respectively, it was not likely that the non-parametric procedures 
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could have produced statistically meaningful and ultimately, different results. The results 
from the non-parametric testing produced similar results as the ANOY A tests . 
The next and final chapter of this study will focus on limitations during the 




CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Although no statistically significant emerged, observations and 
conclusions can about the implications of the overall experiment. Combined 
with the from prior research, the potential for hindsight to exist in the 
auditing context is inevitable and the focus of mitigating this phenomenon may be the 
next research topic. 
Conclusions 
First, relatively insignificant difference exhibited between the foresight 
and hindsight group leads the researcher to believe that the auditor's opinion is a weak 
manipulation to for 
audit opinion his subjects 
Buchman (1985) 
yet, to this 
manipulated the type 
both [foresight and 
hindsight] showed a hindsight effect of similar magnitude. Therefore, it may be 




exist in a financial reporting scenario. 
has not on the subject presented in 
results may indicate that in financial reporting situations 
there is relative high ae2:ree of uncertainty, occurrence of hindsight bias 
minimaL Strawser's (1994) indicated, commercial lenders were influenced 
by the level of the accountant's involvement: the more involved the accountant becomes 
associ ated with financial forecasts examination engagement), the more 
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favorable the loan decision. Applying this finding to the current subject, one may 
speculate that the pressure for an accountant to be involved in any process of the 
preparation or presentation of the prospective financial statements and assumptions is 
high; however, the level of responsibility placed upon the accountant to be accountable 
for the forecasts may not be severe as with the case for historical financial information. 
Thus, users of prospective financial statements may be more aware of the nature of the 
projected information and more understandable when actual results differ from the 
projected information. 
Experimental Limitations 
The experimental design and methodology utilized is limited by certain 
constraining factors. The discussion of these constraining factors may help explain the 
reasons for the experiment outcomes and results. In addition, ways of addressing these 
limitations are also included. 
The use of students for the experiment may have prevented the experiment from 
having a "realistic" effect. With very little relevant accounting and financial experience 
beyond what is presented in the scope of the classroom setting, students may have been 
unclear about the directions and purpose of the questionnaire instrument. Moreover, the 
amount of courses taken by the students varied in the different classes. Those who took 
the Advanced Accounting courses had already taken most of the required accounting 
courses for the major (averaging seven accounting classes). In addition, the students 
were a relatively captive audience, selection being based on the professors' time and 
interest. The experiment was also conducted at different times of the day. For instance, 
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research instrument in the intermediate financial accounting and the advanced accounting 
were out the morning early afternoon times, the 
tax accounting class met in the and many students left the was 
administered. Moreover, day the researcher conducted this experiment in the tax 
class, students were preparing for a midterm examination for following class time. 
h".,·".t"r". reasons for the unusual nature of the especially to the 
may be due to these factors that were beyond the control of the researcher. 
research instrument was not without flaws. Reasons for little nr"."""' ....... 
of hindsight bias points to several factors in which the instrument could have been 
altered. 
have 
rather than two types of unqualified 
more extreme-an unqualified and a qualified or 
opinions, the result could 
opinion. This may 
have caused the participants to pay more attention to the audit opinion. In addition, the 
audit opinion was the only true indication any potential problems the company would 
have. 
Second, the assumptions and financial statements provided the 
questionnaire not directly point to any potential problems that the company may 
In fact, the reliance on prospective financial statements by partici pants surprised 
the researcher. Out the 64 participants, only seven participants, in the ","'".VUI"I. question 
of the research instrument, referred to a factor other than something disclosed in 
prospecti ve financial statements. should the be re-conducted, the 
statements should provide a more serious outlook than 
they should not be included in the research instrument at all. 
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did, or 
Another limitation with the research instrument is that the third set of questions 
did not directly correlate to the hypotheses tested. The questions, as presented in chapter 
. four, could have been altered to test the expectations about the accountant's level of 
responsibility and involvement with prospective financial information. 
Future Research 
This thesis represents an attempt to test for the presence of hindsight bias 
in the scenario of prospective financial information and its effects (if any) on the 
accounting profession. Experience with the present study strongly suggests that there is a 
need for future research in this area. In addition to the limitations and constraints 
proposed to address in the prior section, there has not been other forms of research 
conducted in the observing the presence of hindsight bias in the context of prospecti ve 
financial information. Studies to understand this phenomenon and reasons for its 
presence will help in understanding how it may affect accountants in the arena of 
prospective financial reporting. 
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APPENDIX A 
PARTICIPANTS' DEMOGRAPHICS AND QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
I. Overall Participant Demographics and 
QI Comments 
ill. 1 Results 
IV. Design 2 Results 
Design 3 Results 
VI. 4 Results 
AM IS (Intermediate Financial 11) Class Results 
Vill. AMIS 624 Accounting 11) Results 
AMIS (Tax Accounting II) Class Results 
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I. 
OVERALL PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS AND RESPONSES 
TOTAL 
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II. 
Ql AND Q2 COMMENTS 
PART CLASS DESIGN II 
1 \:-dI S 626 I expe nses increase, Inc[e'l ~e r[otit 
2 . \.\I1S (, 26 I elate sottw;tre progr;llTl 
3 .\\IJS (,26 I 
-l ,\\ IIS ()26 I How maIll' co mpal11e s need thts , o ttw;tre 
.3 ,\.\[I S (,2 6 ~ ~o pannent time tmmes arc gi,'c ll. 
-
6 .\\ [[S (,26 2 more than enough to atford th e loan 
7 ,\\ [l S 626 2 tlow shown as decreasing the 2nd ,'car 
looks like the'· are in ok,\\" financial slLlpe, T he co mpaIll' seems stable allll 
8 .\\ lI S 62(, 3 good 
9 ,\ \[ IS (, 26 3 ~ / I) 
10 .·\\IIS (,26 3 :\11 info rmation sugge sted a good J'bn anel nccd to r the se t"ice 
11 ,\ \ IIS ()2(' 3 declining signiticanth- in 2nd , ' C,H 
12 ,\\[I S 626 3 so ftwarc secmed good 
13 .\\ [[ S 626 ~ 
14 .\\ [I S (, 26 ~ rcc ei"e monel' [;lster 
15 .\ \ [IS (, 26 ~ I think thi s is a ,·oung compan,'--more info \\'i ll IlC Ileeded to eva luate loan 
16 ,\.\ IIS 626 ~ Increase in RE, Cas h, & [\; et Proti t with littlc increase in exp enses 
17 .\ \ liS ,~22 I Little illcrease in operaung expenses 
18 ,\\ JIS 522 1 "ear 
19 ,\\ IIS 522 1 T he,' have a high _\/ P and l\/ P In re latio n to cash 
Efficienc,' o f \ fBR, higher claims tllrn O\'e r, reduction of processing costs, 
20 ,\ .\ IIS 522 I I plus, it's a se n 'ice compaol', so rel :ni\'e ll' lOll" se t-up cos ts 
21 . \\ II S 522 I debt in 200 1 
22 ,\\I1S 522 I claims) 
23 ,\\ IIS )22 I rati o 
24 .\\IIS)22 I Proftt, RE, Financial ratios, cash tl O\\'S 
25 ,\\[lS )22 2 Increase in RE, cash !lows 
26 ,\.\ [IS 522 :2 Prospecti\'e Income Statement & ~ e t Protit 
27 ,\\IIS ,~22 2 
28 ,\\ !lS 522 2 cash tlow 
29 ,\\[ IS )22 ~ Uncertainty of techno logy , future Ill ;trkct sh:lrc 
-
30 . \~[[S 522 2 200 I; Cash tlow, especia li l the cash IJ;t\;lllce 
,\ ssuming the numbers are accurateh- Illcdicted; the lending office r ma,·de a 
31 . \.\IlS )22 2 Igood decision . Howe ve r, as noted Ill" the ,\CC Olllllan l, this is difticll[t to do 
32 .\\lJS 522 3 
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II. 
QI AND Q2 COMMENTS 
PART CLASS DESIGN II 
tlnanclal sraremenrs ,:]1011' rhar there wa s a false a llowance , I r 5hows rhar 
33 ,\ \ II S 522 3 receil'ables Incre,lscd when the I' wanr ro decrease this acco unt. 
34 .\\IlS 522 .3 ::\e r ca,h tl ow 
35 .\\[[S 522 3 The r had a 5ubstanrial , t;nt up IIlI'estmenr ro contribute 
Increase In net IIlco me; .\d l'anced ,:o fm'are &. rechnolog,' shOldd han: helped 
36 V,[ [S 522 .3 Ihem pal'·o ff debt because of el'c ntu;llh- dec re;lse in process in g costs 
37 \\[IS 522 3 The loan; Their commitment 
II appeared to be a reasonabll' secure deCISion. IJUt \rBR did nor realll' 
38 .\\IIS 522 .3 IpwI'ide infolmarion abo ut rhe acruallikelihood of success 
39 ,\\ I1S 522 .3 wo uld pre5cn t grear returns 
40 V, Il S 522 ~ Relaincd earnings, ::\er protir, "icr cash flo w, Toral debl to tOLII as,ets 
41 ,\\IIS 522 ~ th end of lSI I'ear. It does nOI seem fea slbl e l 
42 ,\\US 522 ~ Debl ratio dropped ; CP.\ nor gil'e an unqualitled report 
43 .\\[IS 522 ~ The kUlJ o f huoiness ; Financial ratios 
44 ,\\IIS :)22 ~ Increase ner profit; Decrease in curren I r'Hio 
45 .\\[ [S 522 ~ D e bt ro roral assets ratio; )\iet cash noli's 
46 . \\[IS 522 ~ from CPA . 
47 :\\ lIS 62~ I 
48 .\\ lIS 62~ I sla tement; the phn 
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50 ,\:\lIS 62~ 1 lEa,';]lJ les decreased,yrotirable corpocHion 
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52 .\ \ [[5 62~ 2 
53 .\;'-IIS 62~ 2 big ri sk assumed bl' reil'ing on these numbe rs 
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55 .\\IIS 62~ 2 making rhe loa n work 
56 ,\:--1[S 624 ,) Pros pecril'e Balance Sheer 
57 ,\ \ IIS 62~ .3 The posit il>e effec i it would hal'e on Ihe hospital 
58 .\\115 62~ .) ;;o ftware updates were intluential 
59 .\ ;" [IS 62~ .3 Positil'e net Income; Increasll1J?; currenr ratio; Decreasll1g debt ro ;]sse t ratio 
60 ,\ \ [[ S 62~ .) actual resulrs 
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62 .\ .\ II S 62~ ~ lcc hnolo?;l', The resu lrs th el' wo uld expec r would mosr liklel' t;]ke longer 
63 .\\lIS 62~ ~ 





















































































































(tl III I (<JIll 


























































































::JI\ ,1.: II' 
,1.:)\ 
1)1' 




" 1,1 (Jlil 
























I ~Z9 ';11\\ I t 
J ')0') ,11\\' I f 
19;:') SII\\ l 
; ')[9 ~Ii\\' I I 
1'<'),11\\ I f' tZ~ SIIII I OS 
t(l)~ll\;\' 6t 
t;:<J,Il\1 I St 
re') SII\\ I Lt 
... (~~il\\ tz 
~:~ ~j 1\\ fZ 
zz, ,1111' l, 
zz~ ~II\'\' IZ 
ZZ"S ::11'\\ 0, 
I ZZS ':11\1 61 
Z;:<: ::11\\ 81 












,1.:11\ i "1.·1 
o U\ Sl 
NI:l I SINV HOlvl" ){N"t! lHVd . 






























































































































(filii I (,HII 


























































































':',1 .I: )\ 
,I: )1 
,I,: l\' 

















" I' \ 
t \ 
\ \ 













rN~ : N!)IS30 
SI 
'}J.'d .10 JJqwnN 
'JZ') ;:11\ \ ,1 
I)Z:I) ~II\\' It 
'IZ') ~II\ \ 01 
l)ZI) :-:11\;\ 6 
'J,') '11\'\' S 
tC~ ';11\\ 09 
t,') ,11\\' 6£ 
t;:l) :'11\\ 8, 
r~!) ~H\\ LS 
tZ') :-:11\\ 9£ 
;;,' ,11\ I 6f 
;:l ~ :-:H\\ 8f 
:~Z~~J!\\ Lf 
,-,' '11\\ 9f 
'" "I\;\ £f 
", ,11';\' tf 
ZZ~ :-:ll\'\ If 
,e' ';11\\ if 
SS\!I) HIVd 






srus:nl t l\:~)IS::lO 
'1.\ 
as £1 






c c II 
Z't I L 
}is (lL 
\ <; I 
Z'·t Ie 
I t~' LI 
') r xl 
t t iCL 
: t Inc 
'je >!Z 









;: \ ') I 
. ~ ~Z 






(ur,"I'.J)III I (IRl0.l)1ll 
I 
81' 






NV3~'II .'" ....... ,," 
t c 
. Z Z , IZ 0 f .D\· e t 
t- e t \ ~ 0 t ,U\· t t-
<; S ~ , ~ t- O t .1.:)\ t t-
[' , t \ I :t 0 ! Nt'l f t-
l 1 Z r L f I J 1.1\1, / NI:I 0\11: ) t-
1 ~ l !. I f Z NUX'I 1,\:1'1 t t 
'j 'j 'j S 'J t I S ,1.)\ t 
~ I I , S Z Sd() I ",1,1 t f 
t \ t 0 Z U\· t r 
'J ;: it - \ S Z ~1.1 t ~ 
c \ \ 
" 
< \ 0 Z ,U\ t \ 
t \ S 
" 
\ f Z "<;1,1 t I' 
S 
" 
\ ~ ;: 0 Z ,1.:)1 \ 
V 'J ') ~ ~ L 0 S .U\ t \ 
S is t ( \ 1 Z ,",1,1 t \ 
t ') t - , 0 t ,1:)\ t Z , 
!. L L , I f .U\ t L 
S < t- c 
" 
0 Z \:\'1/ ,1)\ t , 
S ') t S , 0 Z 1.'11\ I ,,1,1 \ L 
'j c 'J c , ~ Z NI,I t Z 
'J t ~ 'J :: \ I f 1.')\ t ;: 
t ~ t t ;: c 0 I .U\ t ;: 
t t \ c \ I Z I.'ll -; I :-:1.1 t I 
:: c <; c c 0 t (I \::1 t I 
, 
'J ') c I , Z Z L'lll ;' .U\ t I 
') ') ') , ') :' Z f :-:11 I.U\ t I 
c: c: 
" 
t- O I '..1.·1 i Dill t I 
t ~ t , :: I 0 t .1.)\ t 1 
\ L c o· ') \ 0 Z .1.1.I."n.\:::d t I 
\ , ') t 0 r .UI t I 
(S) III (t) III \f)J II (WII (1)1Il I 
£b ON\' lb O.l S3SNOdS3~ Nl:l SII'IlV 'lI0 I VI'll )lNV'lI N91S30 
1VLO.l 1V.lO.l 
S1. 'lnS:nI SS\"'l:) (II ~NI1.N!lO:):)V 'l\"DN\"l\Jlcl 31.VI{]31-\J1I3HJIl ZZS SII\lV 
'IIA 
Of 
!Jed )0 J~qwn N 
eeS SIJ,\ 91" 
LLS qJ~\' 51' 
tL' ~IJ \\ rr 
LLS Sll~\ ft 
eLS SII" zt 
ZLS ';1I,\ It 
eLS SII,\ Ot 
Z,S SII,\ 6f 
Z,S Sll~\ Sf 
"eSIIII Lf 
zz, ~II\\ 9£ 
L;:S ~II\\ Sf 
LZS :-;111\ tf 
Z;:S :-:11\\ ff 
ZZS ,,11\\ Zf 
,ZS SII\\ If 
i "S :-:11\\ Of 
LZS ';11\\ 6Z 
cZS ~II\\ flZ 
LC~ -;11\\ LZ 
Z':S~II\\ 9Z 
Z;:, ';11\\' £2 
zz, :::11\\ tZ 
~~~:,Il\\ rz 
cc~ :::11,\ 'lZ 
cee'II,\ IZ 
;:ZS" ~II\\ OZ 
L" ~II\\ 61 
e;:c: :::11\\ SI 
CZC: :::111\ Ll 
SSVlJ l'llVd 
PART CLASS DESIGN 
Number of Part 
18 
VIII. 









AMIS 626 (TAX ACCOUNTI CLASS RESULTS 
TOTAL TOTAL 





,\C [' / 1'1" 3 (, 
\(1 0 5 (, 
\U ,; 0 5 
" 





I. Questionnaire given to participants in Cells A 
II. Bankruptcy Outcome Knowledge and Instructions given to Cells C and D 
III. Versions of Unqualified Audit Opinion 
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Introduction 
The is to how individuals 
early stage small businesses the 
finanCIal statements provided in the 
In the information 
"""HelP" for you, we ask you to evaluate the loan officer's 
deCISion this start-up company a loan, 
Your Role 
You will a,;,ume the role of a loan examiner. 
a,ked to evaluate the loan deCIsions made 
You have been 
In 
1999, the loan officer a loan 
start-Up company on a set of 
,aatcmcnts and assumptions made by the management of the 
company, It IS now the end of 2001 and you will decide whether 
or not the loan officer made the right decision in this 
2 
You are here 




from MBR's 1999 loan aIJ!)UCall'UIl, 
:'[RR, Inc. is funding to become a full-service 
mct!Jcal reimbursement business, The strategy is to provide 
one-stop shopping for medical billing and reimbursement 
,ervlces for medical Charges to 







lffiPf()Vr:s cash flow, 
and 
MBR can reduce proces,;ing costs in medical 
or more with their electronic 
statistics indicate that It currently costs a 
between S8,00-S10,00 per claim to process 
to suppOrt the 
expenses for MBR 
(-[owever, setting up the 
infrastructure may 
With the expected 
and level of transactions, 
revenues later wiU the costs, 
For its new ,;oftware, :'LBR will conduct on-sac 
sessions to help customers 
H<:alth Care ,\dmmistration 
sot~vare program is UD-tcH.l:ate 
and updating this 
the level of 
the medICal billing 
MBR is 555,000 to this busmess, 
IS rcyuc:<ting to borrow an additIOnal S90,000, The business 
will be financed through cash flow, With a servlCe-
oriented busmess, the malO investment IS for mltial software 
and computer 
CPA's Opinion on MBR Inc.'s Financial 
Statements and Assumptions for years 2000 
and 2001: 
We have examined the accompanying forecasted 
balance sheet, statements of income, and statements of cash 
flows of MBR, Inc, for the years 2000 and 2001. Our 
examination was made in accordance with standards for an 
examination of a forecast established by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and 
included such as we considered necessary to 
• current with Im;urance and evaluate both the assumptions used by management and 
3 
5. 
so that claims are paid on a 
• on receivables and co-
payments, 
• that fees are kept at the maximum allowable 
insurance carriers are or 
• Pwcedure codes are current so that claims are not 
suspended or rejected, 
assist 
electronic 
medical the MBR, Inc, will offer 
of medical insurance claims, This is critical 
since the Government will mandate electronic 
:<ubml"lon of Medicare claims In the near future, 
MBR, Inc.'s state-of-the-art software will allow the phYSICian 
to dictate patient records and to initiate reports to 
nrrlvl<iers using hand-held computers (PDAs), 
Statistics show turnaround on paper insurance claims to be 
60, and even 90 
the and of the forecast, 
In our opinion, the forecast is 
presented in conformity with guidelines for presentation of 
a forecast established by the Amencan Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, and the underlying assumptions 
provide a reasonable basis for management's forecast. 
However, there will usually be differences between the 
forecasted and actual results, because events and 
circumstances frequently do not occur as and 
those differences may be matenal. We have no 
responsibility to update this report for events and 
circumstances after the date of this report, 
[Signed] 
"'<:,0('1,)"''' CPAs, LLP 
30, 1999 
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Prospective Balance Sheet 
(Prepared with assistance from CPA) 
2000 
Assets 
Cash S 98,957 S 
.\CCOunts Receivable 67,809 
Eguipment & Software (Net) 110,860 
Total Assets 277,626 
Liabilities and Capital 
.\ccounts Payable 75,788 
Notes Payable 84,112 
Paid in Capital 55,000 
Retained Earning:; 62,726 
Total Liabilities and Capital $ 277,626 $ 
Prospective Income Statement 
(Prepared with assistance from CPA) 
2000 
Sales s 168,000 S 
Total Operating Expenses iH9.'i93) 
Taxes Incurred ( 15,681) 
Net Profit 62,726 
Beg. Retained Earning:; 0 
Ending Retained Earnings $ 62,726 $ 
Prospective Statement of Cash Flows 





















Change in .\ccounts Payable 
Change in Notes Payable 
Change in .\ccounts Receivable 
Net Cash Flow 
Cash Balance 





$ 174,569 $ 








Selected financial ratios 
Ratios 
Current 




2001 Industry Profile 
2.72 1.57 
57.60% 43 .90% 63.70% 
In 1999, the lending officer approved a loan for MBR, Inc. in 
the amount of $90,000 with the preceding information. 
I. How strongly do you believe that the loan officer's decision, 
at the time he/she made it, to grant the loan was the right 
decision (p lease circle)? 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 + 1 
Strongly believe that 
the Loan 0 fficer 
DID NOT make the 
right decision 
+2 +3 +4 +5 
Strongly believe that 
the Loan 0 fficer 
DID make the righ t 
decision 
II. What other factors in the information given influenced 
you in selecting the answer above? Please lis!. 
IlL Please evaluate each of the foUowing guestions (please 
circle): 
1. How much responsibility IS the CPA assurrung for the 
accuracy of the forecasted financial statements? 
Little Great 
Responsibility 2 3 4 5 6 7 Responsibiliry 
2. How confident are you that the forecasted financial 
statements accurately reflect the probable future financial 




Responsibility 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Great 
Responsibility 
How much assurance is the CPA giving with respect to the 
achievability of forecasted results-
Little 
Responsibility 23456 7 
Great 
Responsibility 
4. To what extent do you feel the CPA evaluated the 
assumptions made by the management of MBR, Inc.'s 
services to generate the projected financial statements-
Little 
Responsibility 2 3 4 56 7 
Great 
Responsibiliry 
5. In making a loan decision, how much reliance would you 
place on the projected financial statements? 
53 
Little 
Responsibility 2 3 456 7 
Great 
Responsibiliry 
Bankruptcy Outcome Knowledge and given to Cells C D 
1 n the lending 0 a loan tn amount 
preceding l!1 forma uon. 
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III. 
of Unqualified Opinion 
A. Standard Unqualified Opinion: 
CP.\'s FinanCIal Statements and for 
\C1rS 2000 and 2001 
\'Ce ha\"e examined the foreca~ted balance statements of l!1come, and 
statements of tlows of t\!BR, Inc tor the ,"ears 20ULl and 2no I Our examinauon was made tIl 
accordance wuh standards for an examinauon of a forecast established the Amencan Instimte of 
Certified Public .\ccountants and , lI1c1uded such as we considered necessary to 
e\"aluate both the and presentauon of the forecast. 
In our forecast is presented 111 with for 
presentation of a the .. \mencan Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the 
underlnng assumpuons proVIde a reasonable basis for forecast. Howe\'er, there will 
be differences between the forecasted and actual resuits, because events and circumstances 
CU'-'CIIU\ do occur as expected and those differences mal" be matenal. We have no responSibility to 
update d11S report for e\-ents and circumstances occurring after the date of tIllS report 
B. Unqualified Opinion with Additional Comments about Management's 
Assumptions: 
\X'e ha\-e exarruned the accompanying forecasted balance statements of income, and 
statements of cash Hows of MBR, Inc. for the lears 2{)()O and 2001. Our examinauon \Vas made !I1 
accordance with smndards for an exarrunation of a forecast c,rabLisiled the ,\mencan Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants and accordingly, mcluded slich proceJures as we considered necessary (Q 
cyaluate both the used by management and the preparation and of the forecasL 
In our 
presentation of a 
underlying 
company to establish 
The 
the accompanymg forecast !!1 with guidelines for 
established by the .\mencan Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the 
a reasonable for forecast. 111e for the 
its initial software and eejUlpment IS critical to the success of its 
costs associated with and software rna)' result ill higher costs 
illcreasmg revenues lts proiected sales will be based on the 
a significant share m a competitive market. there will 
usuallv be differences the forecasted and actual results, because events and Clfcumstances 
frequently do nOt occur as and those differences mar be matenaL \Ve have no to 
this report for events and Clfcumstances occurrmg after tile date of this report. 
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